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The Last Domino
“If you cannot define freedom in your own country or in the 
Territory of Papua-New Guinea, I doubt very much if you can 
contribute to freedom in Vietnam.”— John Kaputin, Sydney, 
16/ 9/ 70.
T H E  A U STR A LIA N  A U T H O R IT IE S cut their teeth, in terms of 
foreign affairs, on New Guinea when, back in 1883, the Queensland 
Colonial G overnm ent attem pted to annex all of New Guinea east 
of the present border of W est Irian. By the end of W orld W ar I, 
a modest measure of political, military and economic hegemony 
had been established there by A ustralia’s rulers.
P ost-1945 development, particularly since 1949, has produced a 
new era of A ustralian foreign policy focussed on a deliberate 
involvement as junior local partner of neo-im perialist great powers, 
in a strategic attem pt to deny control of the South East Asian 
region to the revolutionary people of its com ponent countries. A 
concept of foreign-led military and police action which came to be 
known as “counter-insurgency” was developed by the concerned 
western powers. The British in M alaya, learning from the failures 
of the French in Indo-China and D utch in Indonesia, refined it 
with the help of Australian Army units in the 1950’s. C ounter­
insurgency based on the use of force has remained the core of 
A ustralia’s policy towards SE Asia.
Papua-New Guinea, though only recently in the spotlight of 
A ustralian political controversy, provides the most comprehensive 
dem onstration of the aims and attitudes underlying the policy of 
A ustralia’s rulers towards all our near neighbours. I t is the only 
country outside A ustralia in which A ustralian adm inistrators make 
the main decisions and A ustralian investors and companies are 
the dom inant exploiters of labor and resources. A ustralia is the
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colonialist power in PNG just as was France and then the USA in 
Indo-China, and Britain in the M alay Peninsula. Just as the historic 
tides of revolution are squeezing those western imperialist powers 
out of SE Asia, so pressures are building up against continued 
A ustralian overlordship in New Guinea.
The Australian Economic Stake
Until the 1960’s, economic development of PNG moved at a 
leisurely pace. The scene had long been dom inated by three 
A ustralian companies. The first was Burns Philp, registered in 
Sydney on April 1, 1883, to begin contesting the known operations 
of G erm an colonial trading companies around New Guinea. BP, 
which is thus as old as A ustralian concepts of New G uinea as a 
necessary defence bastion, expanded through island trading, ship­
ping, plantations, hotels, retailing, travel and shipping agencies, 
insurance and trustee operations,
W. R. C arpenter & Co. Ltd. was next, founded 1914. In 
activities not unlike those of BP, by 1969 ordinary capital was $18m 
and net profit for the year m ore than $6im . The third, Steamships 
Trading Co. L td., is the youngest of the trio, founded 1924 in Port 
Moresby.
A fter W orld W ar 2, the world upsurge against colonialism 
became reflected in the U nited Nations. By 1962, the U N  Visiting 
Mission reported in term s sharply critical of A ustralian paternalism  
in New G uinea and urged a crash program  of training and pro­
gressive handing over the the responsibilities of adm inistration and 
government. I t urged tha t the Australian G overnm ent “ should 
cease its courtship of speculative capitalists who might be tempted 
to investigate and invest in New G uinea”1.
However, the ’sixties saw vast changes that paid little heed to that 
injunction. A n increasing swarm of Australian companies and 
individuals descended on the expanding urban centres such as Port 
M oresby, Lae, R abaul and M adang to establish construction firms, 
car sales agencies, tim ber extraction and processing plants, soft 
drink factories, service industries. A ir transport, the only signi­
ficant form of travel, was integrated into A ustralia’s two-airline 
systems. A ustralian Consolidated Industries, A ustralia’s biggest 
glass m anufacturers, drew  the lesson of high profitability of its 
big Singapore works and its K uala Lum pur and Fiji operations, 
and opened a bottle and container plant at Lae. C arlton United 
Breweries joined with a Japanese partner to open PN G ’s first 
big brewery.
1 Osmar W hite, Parliam ent of 1000 Tribes.
35
From  1955 and still more in the late ’sixties, oil search companies 
representing most m ajor oil interests overseas began finding oil 
and gas. M inerals became very big. F irst came the giant copper 
project in Bougainville, from which a subsidiary of Conzinc Riotinto 
of A ustralia, after extensive site construction by Australian and 
Am erican firms, aims to take out 160,000 tons of copper ore a 
year, worth $200m  annual at present, for the next 35 years. 
A m erica’s K ennecott Copper claims to  have found even richer 
ore near the West Irian border, and an associate of Mt. Isa Mines 
is chasing copper in the highlands. In  1964 a group of Australian 
banks, insurance and industrial interests formed the Australian 
New G uinea Corporation Ltd., “to attract and develop investment 
in Papua and New G uinea” . One of its directors, Sir James 
Kirby, soon had a refrigerator plant operating in Port Moresby.
To keep some rationality in such a wave of investment and to 
prom ote foreign capitalist enterprise, there was established in 1965 
on the recom m endation of a W orld B ank visiting mission, the 
Papua and New Guinea Development Bank, wholly Government- 
owned, its operations being financed from the A dm inistration 
budget. Though chartered to seek “balanced development” and 
“the advancem ent of the indigenous population” , in practice “most 
of the bank’s loan money has gone to  expatriates”2. All this 
was developing on the basis of the m ost ruthless exploitation of 
the black workers.
The m onetary and banking system of PNG is largely that of 
Australia. The Australian foreign exchange system is equally 
applicable to the Territory. The powers of A ustralia’s central 
bank, the Reserve Bank of A ustralia, apply to  PNG. All trading, 
savings and development finance facilities are provided by branches 
of A ustralia’s banks: Commonwealth Banking Corporation, Bank 
of NSW, A N Z  Bank and the National Bank of A ustralasia. The 
1963 Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Report, published 1965) declared that establishment 
of a separate m onetary system would not be of economic advantage 
to the Territory. It noted that existing access to foreign exchange 
through A ustralia and complete freedom of payments between 
PNG and A ustralia were factors “of param ount im portance from 
the point of view of confidence of the foreign investor. The 
necessity for a central bank will only arise in case of political 
independence of the Territory and even then there may be advant­
ages to a close relationship, if such could be arranged, between 
the Territory and A ustralia” .
- Ur. P. W. C urtin , m anager, PN G Division, Reserve Bank of Australia, 12/9/69.
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The Mission forecast the need to reduce salary levels in public 
service and private employment in the future as more and more 
posts were passed over from  expatriate to indigenous employees. 
(One of the first actions taken in 1964 by Barnes as M inister, 
appointed at the end of 1963, was to cut indigenous Public 
Service salaries by 40 per cent.) New land laws for PN G  introduce 
a system of registered land titles which, for the first time, will 
enable companies or individual white capitalist farmers, indus­
trialists or businessmen to buy land direct from indigenous title- 
holders. Up to the introduction of this law, such investors coaild 
only buy land which the Adm inistration had first acquired from 
the New Guineans at some time —  whether by force, purchase or 
trickery.
Little wonder that an Australian Financial Review correspondent 
was able to  write (1 2 /8 /7 0 )  that the new land system “would 
stimulate foreign investment in agricultural development projects” .
This accelerated rate of development, stim ulated by government 
concessions and subsidies to  private industry, has abruptly projected 
thousands of New G uinean people into an understanding of racial 
discrimination in wage rates, of resistance to land alienation, of 
trade unionism and strikes. Displacement of communities from 
traditional lands (e.g. at A raw a in Bougainville) has stirred others 
into understanding that they, or their forbears, had been robbed 
of lands in the earlier colonial period.
Such profound stirrings have, not surprisingly, led investors to 
hesitate about the future of PNG as a region of super-profitable 
exploitation. They become m ore nervous over statem ents by men 
like young M ataungan leader John Kaputin that
An independent Papua-New G uinea would have to  consider expropria ting
A ustralian and foreign enterprises unless there  was a change in  Australian
economic policies in the  T errito ry .3
There can be little doubt tha t the replacem ent of A dm inistrator 
O. D. Hay in M ay, 1970, accompanied by M inister Barnes’ 
announcem ent tha t he would step down at the next election, was 
due to  the insistence of big m odern capitalist interests who were 
worried by the continuance of old-style, pro-planter policies that 
had provoked the massive and defiant dem onstrations in Bougain­
ville and New B ritain  (1969). A n example of investors’ backlash 
was the announcem ent in M ay, 1970, by Steamships Trading Co. 
of the abandonm ent of a scheme for a $4m international-standard 
hotel at Lae, due to  “loss of confidence” by overseas financial 
backers.
3 Council of NG Affairs, Sydney sem inar, Septem ber, 1969.
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A dm inistrator Hay, at the opening of the A C I factory at Lae, 
was doubtless voicing an urgent C anberra directive when he told 
investors tha t future investments in the T erritory would be secure. 
The business community need pay no attention to rumors that
the G overnm ent is p lann ing  the in troduction  of a separate currency or some 
form of exchange control which m ight im pede the  remission of m oney from 
the T errito ry  to Australia.*
This confirm ed a 1966 Federal G overnm ent stipulation that 
development of the Territory was “dependent upon outside capital” .
Political Strategy
Despite this rapidly expanding and rich stake in PNG, Australian 
L iberal-C ountry Party governments have had to cope with the 
U N  pressure to implement the undertaking, under the Trust 
Agreement, of development of PNG tow ard self-determination. 
W hereas on D ecem ber 4, 1959, the then Territories M inister 
H asluck had approvingly quoted Prim e M inister M enzies’ earlier 
words: “H ere we are and here we stay” , already by June 20, 
1960, M enzies himself adm itted he had  changed his views and 
favored self-government “ sooner ra ther than la ter”5. In  1963 
M enzies said: “We look forward to  the time when those Territories 
(Papua and New Guinea) will be completely politically and 
economically independent”8
It is interesting and significant tha t in 1965 came clear signs 
(from the new Territories M inister Barnes) that there were second 
thoughts in Canberra, and that a search was on for alternatives. 
“The people of the Territory might seek some closer association 
with this country,” said Barnes. H e spoke of a “variety of 
arrangem ents” possible between “self-government” and “sovereign 
independence” .
Today, at the beginning of 1971, the Governm ent is committed 
to the process of handing over a lim ited range of internal admin-’ 
istrative responsibilities to departm ents in Port M oresby headed 
by indigenous M inisterial M embers (of the House of Assembly) 
while retaining the formal right to intervene7. This is preparation 
for “self-government” . “ Independence” is quite a different cate­
gory. Control of police, arm ed forces and law courts, external 
affairs and trade, civil aviation and large-scale development projects
* Australian Financial Review , 26/5/70. Interestingly, only seven m onths later, 
A dm inistrator L. Johnson had to repeat this assurance. 
r> Peter Hastings, N ew  Guinea: Problems and Prospects, Ch.7.
11 Jefferson O ration , in the USA.
" Prim e M inister G orton’s speech, Port Moresby, 6/7/70.
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—  all at present retained by Canberra for the indefinite future —  
would all have to be taken over by a politically independent, 
indigenous government. No government spokesman has esti­
mated how far ahead that might beN. The latest form ulation of 
policy on this crucial point came at the end of 1970: “There was 
no change in the A ustralian Governm ent attitude to PNG inde­
pendence. The Governm ent did not intend to impose a tim e­
table on independence. It would depend on the wishes of the 
m ajority”". A t the same time, there have been many signs that 
the G overnm ent secretly aspired to arrange an “independent” 
PNG that retains a “special relationship” with A ustralia10. For 
example, M r. Barnes:
Overseas investors will take renewed confidence from the Governm ent's 
declared policy th a t large-scale A ustralian aid will continue to be m ade 
available to Papua and New G uinea after self-government and independence, 
and from the Governm ent's offer to selected experienced overseas officers of 
the T errito ry  Public Service, of a new guarantee of perm anence under the 
Com monwealth n
The Labor Party leadership, on the other hand, has taken a 
stand for short-term  time-tables for self-government (1972) and 
independence (1975). By this means, A LP Leader W hitlam has in 
1970-71 provoked useful controversy in PN G  over G overnm ent 
intentions. Exposures of the degree of exploitation of plantation 
workers (wages as low as 17c a day and “keep”) and of employer 
indifference to labor laws were also useful. However, his studious 
avoidance of any criticism of the transcending role of big-scale 
foreign industrial and mineral capital has made clear the W hitlamite 
view of “independence” as neo-colonialist in nature and, explicitly, 
to “do the same” as Fiji (an ex-colony now dom inated by A ustralian 
capital).
Forces of Coercion
Given that the last two years have seen the most serious and 
politically conscious dem onstrations of defiance of A dm inistration 
authority, what is the substantial basis of the G overnm ent’s 
repeated assurances to A ustralian and other investors in PNG?
The most im portant thing for Australians to com prehend about 
the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary is that this force
8 Except when M inister Barnes caused uproar in  April, 1068, by assenting to a
pressman s suggestion th a t independence m ight not come for “20 or 30 years." 
n M inister Barnes, quo ted  in Port Moresby Po^t-Courier, 21/12/70, com m enting 
°n  reported  statem ent by A ustralian H igh Commissioner X. F. Parkinson in 
Singapore, th a t PN G m igh t have independence “ by the  end of the decade”.
10 T his idea was also suggested in the  W orld Bank R eport, 196,r>.
11 Mr. Barnes, at Port Moresby, 6/7/70.
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of more than 210 officers and 3267 other ranks12 is not so much 
a police force in the A ustralian sense as a fully trained modern 
infantry form ation. It grew from forces set up by both British 
and G erm ans before 1900. A t all stages the constabulary had 
been fully arm ed with rifles and bayonets and trained in military 
fashion. Today, still bearing rifles, they also have m odern “anti­
rio t” training and have used tear-jgas against their countrymen 
both in Bougainville and New Britain. They are quickly mobilised 
in form ations of 1000 or more (e.g. at R abaul) by means of R A A F 
transport aircraft. Chartered helicopters are used for patrolling, 
in radio coordination with m otor vehicles. A  police dog section 
is trained in “patrolling and crowd handling”13. There is a Special 
B ranch which “deals with the police security aspects of the T erri­
tory14.
The short history of the PNG organs of coercion, however, is 
not w ithout internal dispute. In  July, 1964, in Rabaul, 50 indi­
genous police constables mutinied and m arched through the town, 
abusing their white officers and protesting against food and condi­
tions in such term s as “we eat like pigs” (Australian, 2 7 /7 /6 4 ) .
Such incidents perhaps lent conviction to the statem ent of 
political philosophy by Police Com m issioner R. Cole at the 
R eturned Servicemen’s League annual congress, Lae ( 1 4 /8 /  65), 
that the greatest dangers to Papua and New G uinea did not arise 
from military attack:
. . . R a th e r we m ust be p repared  and watch for a  m uch m ore insidious 
approach . . . th e  greatest danger to P apua and New G uinea is from the 
creation of d iscontent and dissatisfaction towards employers and govern­
m ents . . .15
The other significant feature of the Constabulary is the G overnm ent’s 
evident fear to  prom ote indigenous graduates from Bom ana Police 
College above the rank of Sub-Inspector, and the white racist 
monopoly of its senior officer ranks16.
12 Figures were correct a t 30/9/69.
13 External T errito ries D ept. Journal, May, 1970. Figures given in the  House 
of Assembly have indicated  th a t the weekly ra tio n  of a police dog costs m ore 
th an  th e  average weekly rations allowed to a p lan ta tio n  worker.
14 E.T.D . Journal, May, 1970. T h e  first head of th e  Special Branch was D eputy 
Commissioner A. Erskine, who had  been im ported  from the  post of chief of 
the  B ritish  Colonial Police Special Branch in Uganda, East Africa.
15 For a  po litica l activist’s view of the  police, see Jo h n  K aputin , M ataungan 
spokesm an (Post-Courier, 16/12/69): “Do they th in k  we are animals, pigs, th a t 
they b ring  these dogs here to fight us?"
16 See Sydney Sun-H erald  (18/1/70): W hen  police reinforcem ents were being 
m obilised in  Port Moresby in  early December, 1969, for the air dash to  R abaul 
and a b ig  offensive against the  M ataungan Association mem bers, “no senior 
native police were invited to the police conference (in Moresby) at which this 
was discussed, b u t seven form er South African police officers now in the  Royal 
P apua and New G uinea Constabulary had  taken p a r t.”
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The Pacific Islands Regiment, established in 1951, followed 
the organisation in W orld W ar 2 of two indigenous infantry 
battalions, quite independently of the police. In 1964-65 (the 
period when A ustralia com m itted combat units to Vietnam ) the 
Federal G overnm ent decided on a $40m, three-year military 
construction program  of army barracks, airfields and reactivation 
of naval facilities. M ain expenditure went on the Army. Two 
fully established P IR  units were by 1970 up to 2460 in strength, 
based centrally at M oresby and Wewak, but with barracks also 
at Lae and Vanimo. Significantly, immediately following the 
confrontation of 1000 police with the Tolai of the M ataungan 
Association in August 1970, it was announced that a perm anent 
P IR  cam p was to be set up in East New Britain, thus implementing 
Prime M inister G orton’s instruction during the confrontation that 
the Army could be used to back up police. P IR  officers are 
almost all posted for duty from the A ustralian Regular Army, 
but a few indigenous men have graduated as officers after intensive 
training at Portsea (Vic.). There is a militia force, the PNG 
V olunteer Rifles, totalling about 560 men with H Q  at Port 
M oresby and sub-units at Lae, M adang, G oroka and Banz. M ilitary 
cadets are being enlisted in PNG schools at a faster rate than 
anywhere in Australia.
The Royal A ustralian Navy has a PNG division equipped with 
m odern patrol boats, with H Q  at Lom brum , M anus Island. There 
is a base also at Port M oresby with navy transport vessels and 
army small ships. Recently two Navy patrol boats successfully 
cruised 500 miles up the Fly River to a point close to the 
Kennecott C orporation’s rich copper ore testing concession near 
the western border.
A  flight of R A A F C arabou transport aircraft, used for lifting 
of troops, police and/  o r supplies, is stationed at P ort M oresby. 
Since 1965, a new airfield at Boram  near W ewak has been built 
to  service standards, and the airfield at N adzab (near Lae), Daru 
(on the south-west coast) and smaller strips across the Territory 
near the western border have been m odernised and extended. In 
general the R A A F  regards PN G  as part of its norm al area of 
operations from A ustralian bases such as Townsville and Darwin.
W hat is the envisaged role of these police-infantry and the 
regular arm ed services? A  m ost significant incident occurred on 
April 16, 1968, at a C anberra press conference given by visiting 
Indonesian Foreign M inister M alik. He told pressm en that A us­
tralia and Indonesia were discussing bilateral “defence” arrange­
ments to cover the whole of New Guinea. He said they could 
cooperate for such a purpose. “If the th reat is from  outside,
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we can oppose it together. If the th reat is from within, we can 
cooperate to wipe it out” . The next day, following agitated advice 
from the A ustralian External Affairs D epartm ent, M alik called 
another press conference and said there had been an interpreter’s 
mistake. There had been no talks on defence —  only on a trade, 
aid and cultural agreem ent17. Nevertheless, M alik’s incautious 
statem ent am ounted to confirm ation and elaboration of an earlier 
statem ent by Paul Hasluck as External Affairs M inister —  that 
although Indonesia had said it would not join military pacts
the  Indonesian G overnm ent is cooperating in  practical ways with neighbour­
ing countries for m utua l security and has indicated  that m ilitary  cooperation 
w ith ne ighbouring  countries can develop.m
M ore recent comments on the role of the PNG forces include 
the following: F. A. M ediansky, post-graduate research student, 
Sydney University D epartm ent of Governm ent (New Guinea Quart­
erly, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1970):
It is felt th a t the police force, w ith about 3.300 mem bers, could not sim ultan­
eously handle  several civil disturbances on the  Bougainville scale. T h e  Gov­
e rnm ent is considering ways in which the  arm y could be used to m aintain  
in te rn al security. It could be used to support the  police by providing 
logistic and transport facilities, or to guard  designated areas, or it could 
be used directly  for rio t control or arm ed m ilita ry  in tervention.
M ediansky notes that military and m ilitary-related projects have 
been costing $23m  a year in PNG in recent years. He considers 
that few indigenous officers will be eligible for senior military 
rank in the next 10 years or so. H ence, in saying “perhaps the 
m ost far-reaching consequence for the future of civil-military 
relations in New G uinea would be the use of the army to m aintain 
internal security” , M ediansky envisages its use by continuing 
effective A ustralian military com m and, w hether before or after 
“independence” .
Dr. T. B. M illar, perhaps the best-known civilian academic 
military expert in Australia, and a research fellow in international 
relations at the UN, writes (New Guinea Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
1970, on M elanesia’s Strategic Significance):
It w ould m ake a very considerable difference to A ustralia's strategic position 
if Papua-N ew  G uinea were under the control of a governm ent unfriendly  or 
overtly hostile to Australia.
But what worries M illar most is suggested by this passage in his 
book, Australia’s Defence (p. 176):
“T h e  p o ten tia l situation  to which we should give most consideration is not 
Indonesian attack  on Papua and New G uinea b u t a cam paign which some
IT T ribune , 24/4/68.
is  Hasluck to  Federal Parliam ent, statem ent on 1968 visit to S.E. Asia.
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la ter Indonesian governm ent m ight launch 10 'libera te ' th e  area through 
subversive operations . . He continues:
"H ere  is a fragile vessel for self-government, independence or nationhood. 
In determ ining ils relationship  with the  T erritory , A ustralia m ust not yield 
to in te rnational clam our 01 indigenous demagognery . . ." (p. ISO).
Peter Hastings (NEW GUINEA: Problems and Prospects,
C hapter 7), writes:
W hile East New G uinea rem ains a dependency of Australia, arm ed rebellion 
against the  A dm inistration for any reason, including th a t of external sub­
version, would have the character of sedition dem anding A ustralian m ilitary 
intervention.
Tracing in detail the evidence of A ustralia’s persistent reluctance 
to describe independence as A ustralia’s sole political aim  for New 
G uinea, Hastings (whose views are not ignored by the Gorton 
G overnm ent or by A LP leader W hitlam) finally tends to favor a 
continuing “special relationship” between the two countries “after 
independence” :
T h e  arrangem ent might, well cover Australian aid in m ain ta in ing  New 
G uinea’s arm y and police forces which will be necessary for New G uinea's post- 
independence in te rnal security, the  greatest of New G uinea's post-independ­
ence problem s and a m atter of great concern to Australia.
It is in conjunction with such concepts and such arm ed forces 
that the new Public O rder Bill, passed last September in PNG, 
must be seen. It includes power to exile or confine to his home 
district a person whose words or actions are “likely to lead to 
disorder” ; up to $500 fine o r a year’s jail for anyone holding a 
meeting or procession in a “declared” area w ithout a permit; 
and many other obnoxious and tyrannous features.
Conclusion
PNG is an A ustralian colony, in which there is the largest 
external A ustralian private and corporate investment, rapidly 
expanding on the basis of governm ent guarantees of future security. 
But there is rising internal struggle as the national independence 
revolution takes shape inexorably. Australians are increasingly 
coming into violent conflict with the people in PNG, through 
com m and of police-infantry and regular armed forces. All A us­
tralian arm ed forces are ready to intervene in a counter-insurgency 
role.
In this sense, PN G  —  a country very well suited to guerrilla 
warfare —  is approaching a state of crisis already seen in SE 
Asia and is a potential theatre of large-scale counter-revolutionary 
war by A ustralia’s rulers. E ach step in that direction should be 
opposed strenuously by the A ustralian anti-war movement, for it 
is essentially the same issue as Vietnam.
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